In this work, we focus on strategies to influence the opinion dynamics of a well-connected society. We propose a generalization of the popular voter model. This variant of the voter model can capture a wide range of individuals including strong-willed individuals whose opinion evolution is independent of their neighbors as well as conformist/rebel individuals who tend to adopt the opinion of the majority/minority.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opinion dynamics have been a subject of study in various fields including sociology, philosophy, mathematics, and physics for a very long time [1] . In this work, we focus on a variant of a widely studied binary opinion dynamics model known as the voter model [2] , [3] . In the voter model, society is modeled using a graph where each individual is a node and edges represent links between these individuals. Each individual holds one of two possible opinions, e.g., pro-government and anti-government. The opinions of individuals evolve over time. Assuming time is slotted, one individual is chosen uniformly at random at the beginning of each time-slot. This individual then adopts the opinion of one of its neighbors, chosen uniformly at random. The voter model is a useful framework to study opinion dynamics and the spread of competing epidemics. Variants and generalizations of the voter models have also been studied [4] , [5] .
Our model differs from the voter model in two key ways. Firstly, in each time-slot, the opinion of the selected individual evolves according to a general function of the opinion of its neighbors. This modification to the voter model allows us to model a variety of natures of individuals in society. For example, we can model strong-willed individuals by making the opinion evolution of the selected individual independent of the opinions of its neighbors. Similarly, we can model conformist and rebel individuals when the selected individual tends to adopt the opinion of the majority and minority A preliminary version of this work appeared in [6] .
respectively. Secondly, we focus on the setting where the graph between the individuals is a complete graph. This is justified in the presence of social media platforms like Twitter and the abundance of publicly available poll results on most important issues.
Use of social networks and other media outlets for political campaigning and advertising is on the rise. While opinions of individuals evolve organically over time, this evolution can be influenced by effective campaigning. Resource limitations like a fixed budget or limited manpower restrict the set of feasible influencing strategies and motivate the need to use available resources efficiently.
In political campaigning, the goal is to influence as many individuals as possible by the end of a fixed deadline. Motivated by this, we focus on designing influencing strategies that maximize the number of individuals with a positive opinion at the end of a known and finite time horizon [7] . The optimal influencing strategy is one that maximizes the number of individuals with a favorable opinion at the end of this time horizon.
Most political campaigns tend to ramp up their advertising as the election gets closer. This strategy intuitively makes sense as once influenced by the advertisements towards the end of the time horizon, there is very little time for individuals to change their opinions. In this work, the goal is to understand if this advertising strategy is always optimal for our stylized model.
The key takeaway from this work can be summarized as follows. For a society consisting primarily of strong-willed individuals who are unaffected by the opinion of their peers but are susceptible to external influence or rebels who tend to adopt the opinion of the minority, the optimal influencing strategy is to influence towards the end of the finite time horizon. Contrary to this, if individuals are heavily influenced by their peers and are likely to adopt the opinion of the majority, in some cases, it is optimal to influence at the beginning of the time horizon. Intuitively, this is because increasing the fraction of individuals with a favorable opinion at the beginning of the finite time horizon has a cascading effect on opinions of the society as a whole. In addition, we also conclude that influencing at the beginning of the time horizon tends to be more effective than influencing at the end only when individuals with a favourable opinion are less likely to change their opinion than individuals with an unfavourable opinion.
A. Related Work
Closest to our setting, [5] focuses on the voter model and generalizes it to include external influences. The key takeaway is that the effect of external influences overpowers node-to-node interactions in driving the network to consensus in the long term. In [4] , the focus is on studying the effect of stubborn agents, i.e., agents who influence others but do not change their opinion, on the opinion dynamics of the network. The authors also study the problem of optimal placement of these stubborn agents to maximize the effect on the network.
Designing optimal influencing strategies has been the subject of study in many works including [7] - [10] . Refer to [10] for a detailed survey of various works in this domain. Unlike our work, most of these works focus on the infinite time horizon setting. In [7] , the focus is on characterizing the optimal influence strategy to maximize the spread of an epidemic in a network. In [8] , the focus is on minimizing the cost incurred by the influencer to reach a fixed fraction of nodes in the network. In [9] , the authors propose a general model of influence propagation called the decreasing cascade model and analyze its performance with respect to maximizing the spread of an idea. In [10] , the focus is on designing optimal advertising strategies in the presence of multiple advertising channels.
A related body of work focuses on preventing the spread of disease/viruses in networks (refer to [11] - [13] and the references therein). Our work differs from this body of work since we focus on strategies to increase the spread of favorable opinion in the network.
In [14] - [16] , the focus is on analyzing the performance of various rumor spreading strategies. These works do not focus on finding the optimal strategies for information spread.
B. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally define our opinion dynamics model. In Section III, we discuss some preliminary results on stochastic approximation which are used in the subsequent analysis. In Section IV, we state and discuss our main results. The proofs of the results discussed in Section IV are provided in Section V.
We conclude the paper in Section VI. Some additional results are presented in the appendix.
II. SETTING
We consider a finite population of M individuals, where each individual has a binary opinion ("Yes" or "No") about a certain (fixed) topic of interest. The opinion of each individual evolves over time. We assume the presence of an external influencing agency with a limited budget which tries to shape the opinion of the population over time.
We assume that time is slotted and label the individuals in the population from {1, . . . , M }. We define random variables {I i (t)} 1≤i≤M,t≥0 taking values in {0, 1}, where I i (t) denotes the opinion of the i th individual in time-slot t. Thus, 
denote the total number of people at time t with the opinion "Yes" and "No" respectively.
At each time t, an individual (say i t ) is chosen uniformly at random from the population of M individuals. The opinion 4 of the chosen individual i t evolves in time-slot t according to a Markov process with the following transition probabilities.
The values of p t and q t depend on whether the individual is being externally influenced in time-slot t or not. If the chosen individual is being externally influenced in time-slot t, p t =p and q t =q, else, their opinion evolves in one of the following three ways.
-Type S (Strong-Willed): In this case, the chosen individual is not affected by their peers, more specifically, p t = p and q t = q.
-Type C (Conformist): In this case, the probability of an individual changing their opinion increases with the fraction of the population holding the opposite opinion, more specifically,
M .
-Type R (Rebel): In this case, the probability of an individual changing their opinion decreases with the fraction of the population holding the opposite opinion, more specifically,
These three types of evolution capture three basic ways in which individuals interact with society. Since an individual can also adopt a mixture of these approaches over time, we study two models which allow time-varying nature in individuals.
-Model I: Hybrid S/C
In each time-slot without external influence, opinion evolution of the chosen individual is Type S with probability λ and Type C otherwise, independent of all past choices.
Note that at the two extreme values of λ, i.e., λ = 0 and λ = 1, the individuals are either only strong-willed or only conformists. These special cases were studied in [6] along with an extension to the case of strong-willed population with increasing adamancy with time. Some of the results in [6] can be obtained as special cases of results in this paper.
-Model II: Hybrid C/R
In each time-slot without external influence, opinion evolution of the chosen individual is Type C with probability µ and Type R otherwise, independent of all past choices.
We focus our attention on these two models since they are analytically tractable and lead to insightful results. The analysis for the Hybrid S/R model is similar to that of Hybrid S/C and can be studied using the same tools.
For both these models, we focus on the evolution of opinion of the population over a time horizon of T consecutive time-slots. The advertising agency can influence the opinion in at most bT of the T time-slots, where 0 < b ≤ 1. The goal of the advertising agency is to maximize the number of individuals holding the "Yes" opinion at the end of the T time-slots. The agency needs to decide when to exert influence in order to achieve this goal.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the mathematical framework used in the rest of this paper. The dynamics for random variable N (t) (resp. Y (t)) are as follows.
where, χ(t + 1) is a random variable taking values in {−1, 0, 1} denotes the change in the net opinion of the population at time t + 1. Let F t denote the σ-field generated by the random variables {χ(1), χ (2), . . . , χ(t)}. The evolution of opinion is governed by the random process χ(t). We have:
where, δ N (t) =
M . Note that the χ(k)'s are conditionally independent. As metioned in Section II, the values of p t and q t depend on whether the individual is being externally influenced in time-slot t or not. If the chosen individual is being externally influenced in time-slot t, p t =p and q t =q, else, their opinion evolves in one of the three ways described in Section II.
Definition 1 (Optimal Strategy). We call a strategy optimal if the influence according to that strategy results in a larger expected number of "Yes" at the end of time T than the expected number of "Yes" at the end of time T using any other influence strategy.
If strategy S 1 is better than strategy S 2 , it is denoted by S 1 ≫ S 2 . Note that, for any strategy, the number of time-slots that can be influenced is fixed. We want to find an optimal strategy, in the sense of definition 1, that identifies the time-slots where the influence should be exerted. As we shall see in most cases, due to a monotone argument, it is sufficient to compare the strategies of influencing in the first bT and the last bT time-slots respectively. We use the following definition in the rest of the paper. From the dynamics described above, the following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 1. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). Consider a family of random variables {χ
(p,q) }, parametrized by p, q ∈ [0, 1], defined as follows:
Then if p 1 > p 2 and
Proof. The assertion follows by noting that from (3), we have:
In view of the above lemma and the fact that the total number of people with opinion "No" at time t is given by
, we assume that the influencing agency is rational and only exerts influence in a way that leads to maximizing the expected number of people with "Yes" opinion at the end of time T (or equivalently, minimizing the expected number of people with "No" opinion at the end of time T ). More precisely, we assume the following:
Assumption A (Rational Influence). We assume that the external influence is such thatp <q.
To analyze the evolution of random variable δ N (t), denoting the fraction of people with opinion "No" at time t, we use the theory of stochastic approximation.
The classical stochastic approximation scheme is given by the following iteration for
such that:
(i) {a(n)} is a positive step-size sequence satisfying
(iii) {M n } n≥0 is a square-integrable Martingale difference sequence with respect to a suitable filtration.
Then, Theorem 2, Chapter 2 [17] implies that under certain conditions on the boundedness of the trajectories, the iterates of (4) track the following O.D.E. asymptotically with probability onė
Stochastic Approximation finds use in several problems in machine learning, urn models, reinforced random processes etc.
We rewrite (1) as a constant step-size stochastic approximation scheme for the fraction of "No"s at time t.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) from above are easily verified. From the theory of stochastic approximation, we know the solutions of the above system track the solutions of the O.
. Therefore, from (2), we get that the opinion dynamics is governed by the O.D.E.:
Observe that we have a constant step-size Stochastic Approximation scheme here and Condition (i) discussed above is not satisfied. There has been some recent work on constant step-size stochastic approximation schemes. We refer the readers to [18] , [19] . throughout (minus a small burning time). For instance, Figure 1 shows that the O.D.E. corresponding to the constant stepsize stochastic approximation scheme tracks the difference equation well throughout for one such setting. Thus, it is sufficient to understand the optimal strategies of the influencing agent for the O.D.E. system. In the following sections, we discuss various cases and obtain optimal influencing strategies for the corresponding O.D.E.s.
IV. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first discuss our results for Model I.
A. Model I: Hybrid S/C
In this section, we characterize the optimal influence strategies for the Hybrid S/C case. Recall that this means that in each time-slot when there is no external influence, the opinion of the randomly chosen individual evolves as Type S (strong-willed) with probability λ and Type C (conformist) with probability 1 − λ. Recall from Definition 2 that S L and S F are strategies to influence in the last and first bT time-slots respectively. The main takeaway from Theorem 1 is that it is strictly sub-optimal to influence at the end of the time horizon when the Yes opinion is more sticky than the No opinion and the probability of an individual being affected by their peers is high. In addition, in this case, it is, in fact, optimal to influence right at the beginning of the time horizon. One way to understand this phenomenon is as follows. When individuals are heavily influenced by their peers and people are less likely to flip from Yes to No than from No to Yes, influencing the population at the beginning leads to a cascading effect which outperforms the strategy of influencing people at the very end which minimizes the probability of them switching their opinion before the end of the time horizon.
In all other cases studied in Theorem 1, it is optimal to influence at the end of the time horizon. It is worth noting that in all the cases discussed in Theorem 1, the nature of the optimal policy is independent of the state of the population at the beginning of the time horizon.
We now present some simulation results to illustrate that the performance of our system mirrors the trends obtained by solving the corresponding O.D.E. for this setting. In Figure 2 , we compare the performance of the S L and S F strategies for the setting where p = q. The O.D.E. solution is close to the simulated performance of the system. As discussed in Theorem 1, in this case, the S L strategy outperforms the S F strategy for all values of λ.
In Figure 3 , we compare the performance of the S L and S F strategies for the setting where p > q. The O.D.E. solution is close to the simulated performance of the system. As discussed in Theorem 1, in this case, the S L strategy outperforms the S F strategy for all values of λ.
In Figure 4 , we compare the performance of the S L and S F strategies for the setting where p < q. The O.D.E. solution is close to the simulated performance of the system. As discussed in Theorem 1, in this case, the S L strategy outperforms the S F strategy for values of λ below a threshold and the S F strategy outperforms the S L strategy for values of λ over the threshold.
Note that some of the results in Theorem 1 are restricted to the case when T = ω(M ) and T = o(M ) for analytical tractability. We now present a result which holds for all T for the special case when a individual does not change their opinion from Yes to No without external influence and the external influence is perfect, i.e.,p = 0, andq = 1. While this is a very limited case, our motivation behind discussing the result is to show that similar trends hold for general T . 
B. Model II: Hybrid C/R
In this section, we present our results for Model II. Recall that this means that in each time-slot when there is no external influence, the opinion of the randomly chosen individual evolves as Type C (conformist) with probability µ and Type R (rebel) with probability 1 − µ.
Theorem 2. For Model II defined in Section II and under Assumption A, if the advertiser has a budget of bT time-slots
for 0 < b < 1,
(ii) For µ > 1/2,
, and S L ≫ S F otherwise.
, all strategies perform equally well.
We conclude that in the Hybrid C/R setting, the strategy to influence at the beginning of the time-frame outperforms the strategy to influence at the end in a very limited case. This happens only when the time horizon is small, i.e., at most a vanishing fraction of the individuals change their opinion, and the chosen individual in a time-slot is more likely to conform than rebel, and the stickness of the Yes opinion is above a threshold which is a function of the initial state of the population and the stickness of the No opinion.
We note that unlike Model I, in this case, in addition to the stickiness of the two opinions, the initial state of the population determines which of the two strategies, namely, influencing right at the beginning of the time horizon and influencing right at the end of the time horizon performs better. In this case, similar to that in Theorem 2 (ii), the S L strategy outperforms the S F strategy for values of µ below a threshold and the S F strategy outperforms the S L strategy for values of µ over the threshold.
V. PROOFS

A. Proof of Theorem 1(i)
We consider the strategies S F and S L of influencing the first bT time-slots and the last bT time-slots respectively. • 0 ≤ t ≤ bT : The differential equation is given by
This can be solved to yield
• bT ≤ t ≤ T : The corresponding differential equation is solved by integrating between bT and T . After simplification, this gives us:
Similarly for the strategy S L , we obtain:
Comparing the expected fraction of number of people with "No" at the end of time T of S F and S L , we get:
This is always positive whenever p ≤ q. Thus, whenever p = q and p ≤ q, the expression in equation (9) is a product of positive terms and is therefore strictly positive for all λ, p, q, M and T . We have only shown that S L ≫ S F . However, it turns out this is sufficient to conclude that under the conditions of Proposition 2, S L is in fact the optimal strategy.
Proof of Theorem 1(i).
Consider a strategy S and divide the time interval [0, T ] in three parts: [0, t − 1) be the first t ≥ 0 slots until a pair of slots is encountered where influence is followed by no influence, [t, t + 1] be the first pair of slots (starting from t = 0) such that t is an influenced time-slot and t + 1 is not, and finally (t + 1, T ]. We consider a strategy S ′ that differs from S only in the slots [t, t + 1], where the influence and non-influence is swapped. It is immediate from equations (7) and (8) that S ′ ≫ S. Inductively, we conclude that S L is optimal in the sense of Definition 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 1(ii)
In the absence of any influence, the differential equation is given by:
− λp has two roots; it can be easily verified that the discriminant ∆ =
> 0 for all values of λ, p and q. We denote the roots by A 1 and A 2 , where
and
. Note that A 1 > A 2 . Solving the O.D.E.s corresponding to S F and S L yields:
where L = (1 − λ) (10) and (11), we get: Simulations indicate that in this case S L ≫ S F . We prove this next for the cases when T = o(M ) and T = ω(M ).
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That is, whenever the influencing agency is either able to reach almost no one in the population or able to reach almost everyone, the strategy to influence in the last bT slots is strictly better than the strategy to influence in the first bT slots.
Lemma 2. For a system of M individuals and a time horizon of T time-slots, let E be the event that each individual is influenced at least once in the time horizon of T time-slots and F be the event that the number of unique influenced individuals is o(M ). Then we have that,
Proof. If T = ω(M ), the probability that an individual is not influenced is 1 − 1 M bT . By the union bound,
If T = o(M ), it trivially follows that the number of unique influenced individuals is upper bounded by bT = o(M ).
Proof of Theorem 1(ii).
Note that it is enough to show that S L ≫ S F since an argument on the lines of the proof of Part (i) gives the optimality result. We consider the two regimes separately.
•
. We can simplify the above expression by noting that
Using this, we get that
Since this is always negative, we see that the strategy S L outperforms the strategy S F .
C. Proof of Theorem 1(iii)
In this case, in the absence of influence, the differential equation can be rewritten aṡ
This quadratic equation also has two distinct roots A and A
, where ∆ =
is the discriminant. Solving like before, we observe that:
Thus we get:
where
Observe that since the equation in (15) takes opposite signs at extremal values of λ, there exists a λ * , which we call the cross-over λ, such that for ǫ > 0, for λ in the neighbourhood (λ
, the crossover λ is unique. 
Proof of Theorem 1(iii).
We compare the strategies S L and S F . An argument similar to that in the proof of Part (i) gives us the optimality of the strategies in different regimes of λ. Again, we divide the proof into two cases:
. We can simplify the above expression by
We can write the difference equation as:
which can be simplified to yield:
all λ except when λ = 0 (since λ = 0 implies A ′ 2 = 0). Thus the difference is always negative except when λ = 0.
Thus, in this case, λ * is 0 and unique.
• T = o(M ): In this case, we have e
This gives us D
Thus reducing the first and second terms of the difference equation appropriately and plugging in, the difference equation reduces to: goes from positive to zero, becomes negative and then stays negative. Thus, λ * is unique.
D. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Note that this is the p < q case. From the discussion in Section V-C, we get that A 
which is positive except for λ ∈ [0, 1)
The performance gap of both strategies shrinks to 0 as λ → 1. This is consistent with the result obtained in [6] (See Lemma 2 in [6] ).
E. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof follows using the same tools used in the proof of Theorem 1. We omit the details due to lack of space.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we proposed a variant of the voter model which can be used to model variation in the nature of the individuals in society. We evaluate the performance of campaigning strategies as a function of the nature of individuals when the goal is to maximize the fraction of individuals with a favorable opinion at the end of a known finite time-horizon.
We conclude that if individuals are mostly unaffected by the opinion of their peers or tend to go against the majority opinion, influencing at the end of the finite time-horizon is optimal. In the case where individuals are affected by the opinion of their peers and tend to adopt the opinion of the majority, influencing at the end of the finite time-horizon can be strictly sub-optimal if an individual with a positive opinion is not very likely to change their mind when compared to the probability of an individual with a negative opinion changing their mind.
Possible extensions of this work include modeling the connections between individuals in the society using a graph such that individuals susceptible to being influenced by others are only influenced by their neighbors in this graph. 
We denote this approximate solution by δ approx N . Then we have the following result. 
where, µ 1 = exp −r T ǫ 2 1 2bT (1+r) .
Similarly, for p = q, X(t) = r 
